

Strategic Ambiguity and Power Projection in Indo-Pacific Region: A Perspective of U.S.A and China

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Abstract: *The Indo-Pacific area has become a crucial point in current global politics. The region handles one-third of global trade and a large portion of seaborne oil shipments. The Indo-Pacific region has become very important at present because the United States wants to dominate here and China wants to present itself as the superpower of Asia, for this reason, the two superpowers are busy strengthening their teams. Here, they are attracting small countries to their team in various ways. They adopt methods like strategic ambiguity and power projection to attract small countries to their team, so knowing their methods in depth is very important for this region and the whole world. We can see from reviewing previous studies that the superpowers who are using strategic ambiguity as a tool to dominate or benefit themselves have not been explained or reviewed in depth. So, through this research, we will explore how the United States and China are dominating this region and what their strategies are, how they use strategic ambiguity as their tool. The methodology used is a qualitative method, and most of the information is taken from secondary sources such as various articles, books, journals, and publications. We can see here that the United States is creating various groups in this region to challenge China and maintain its dominance, while China is strengthening itself in various ways by creating new weapons and sometimes through economic policies. From the findings here, we see how the US and China are using small states to put them in a dilemma. So small states should be careful in this regard and maintain their own identity. Moreover, the paper is very important to understand in depth how the United States and China use small countries in this region to maintain their dominance and for their economic development. Along with that, small countries will know what they should do or what policies they should take. This paper will serve as an eye-opener for them.*

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Introduction

The Indo-Pacific area has emerged as a central pillar on the world political stage today. It includes key maritime routes that facilitate approximately one-third of global trade and a significant portion of maritime oil transport (Jochheim & Lobo, n.d.). The U.S. has recognized this potential through initiatives like the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity, which aims to strengthen economic ties among member countries (The White House, 2022a). Additionally, regional partnerships such as the QUAD focus on enhancing economic cooperation while addressing shared challenges like supply chain resilience and clean energy transitions (Marie Kwon, 2023). The military significance of the Indo-Pacific is underscored by rising tensions and competition among major powers. The U.S. views the region as crucial for maintaining its strategic influence, particularly in countering China's growing assertiveness through military expansion and territorial claims in areas like the South China Sea (Shreya Upadhyay, 2014). As a result, the political and military unrest in the region is not limited to the two major powers but is part of a larger regional political shift. Moreover, NATO has recognized the Indo-Pacific's relevance to Euro-Atlantic security, emphasizing cooperation with regional partners to tackle cross-regional challenges (NATO, 2024). It will show how strategic ambiguity affects the political and military decision-making processes of different states and how it plays a role in the dynamics of international relations.

The Indo-Pacific region has emerged as one of the most important geographies in contemporary global politics. China's growing economic ties through the BRI and the United States Indo-Pacific policy reflect the show of political and military power in the region. However, there is a kind of unresolved or uncertain situation in these strategies, which is known as strategic ambiguity. The purpose of this study is to analyze this strategic ambiguity and display of power from the perspective of the United States and China. Therefore, to grasp the strategic ambiguity and Power Projection in the Indo-Pacific from both the US and Chinese viewpoints.

Review of Literature

The strategic competition between the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific region is a complex and multidimensional issue. These essays analyze various aspects of this competition and the strategic thinking of both countries.

Zhang, G., Li, L., & Jiang, T. (2023). wrote 'Indo-Pacific Strategy' from the Perspective of Chinese Scholars.' In this article, the authors analyze the changing interest in Indo-Pacific strategy among Chinese researchers. They show that interest in this strategy was limited in 2013, but increased significantly in 2017–2018. The authors argue that US strategic objectives pose a threat to China and that Chinese researchers have developed a coordinated response to this situation. But here they didn't get a specific Chinese strategy.

Wang, Y. (2023) wrote in his article 'China's View and Counter-Strategies towards the Indo-Pacific Strategy.' China's response to the US Indo-Pacific strategy and its overall approach is discussed. The Indo-Pacific strategy has emerged as an important geopolitical challenge for China. This strategy has been defined by Chinese researchers as an "alliance network" primarily led by the United States, working to limit China's influence. In this review, we will analyze China's approach and their response strategies. Though it lacks to mention counter strategy it provided healthy insights. Raska, M.'s (2020) article titled 'The Indo-Pacific Competitive Space: China's Vision and the Post–World War II American Order' explores that the United States needs to strengthen its existing alliances and promote an alternative development vision. US strategies include increasing military power and economic cooperation, which are intended to limit China's influence. Rusk's analysis shows that political, economic, military, and informational competition exists in the Indo-Pacific region. New security and economic partnerships may be formed, which will make the current situation even more tense.

Lee, J.'s (2020) article titled 'China's Strategic Thinking towards the US Role in the Indo-Pacific, 2017-2020.' analyzes China's strategic thinking, detailing China's position on US presence and influence in the Indo-Pacific region. Here's how China has developed its strategies for U.S. force projection and strategic action. He explains key aspects of China's recent strategic thinking. His research shows that US Indo-Pacific regional policy has directly influenced China's strategic thinking. this paper shows that the policy of United states hampers the strategy of china. Li also pointed

out that China is pursuing a strategy of reducing US influence through its economic and military power.

Heiduk & Wacker, (2020) wrote the article 'From Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific: Significance, Implementation and Challenges' This article mainly focused on the emergence of Indo-Pacific and the strategy of several countries. The author focused on the strategies of India, Australia, and Japan. The United States played a vital role here leading the QUAD and the United States wants to stop the rise of China. However, I notice that the discussion about strategic ambiguity is missing here. The author just presented the power of QUAD, not the ambiguity.

Scott D's (2012) article named 'The Indo-Pacific in US Strategy: Responding to Power Shifts' This article discusses the United States' Indo-Pacific strategy. The article discusses in detail the presence, rhetoric, and diplomatic strategy of the United States in this area. A limitation of this article is that it is limited to the US strategic context, whereas the perspective of other countries, such as China, or the domestic strategic assessment of Southeast Asian countries, has received less importance.

Author Haruko, W.'s article 'The "Indo-Pacific"-New Regional Formulations and New Maritime Frameworks for US-India Strategic Convergence' analyzes the changing geographic scope of the Indo-Pacific region and its diplomatic implications. A limitation of the essay is that it focuses mainly on the geographical definition and strategic message of the region and lacks detailed analysis on the economic and cultural impact.

Baruah, Darshana M's article,' India in the Indo-Pacific: New Delhi's Theater of Opportunity' In this article the author discusses India's Indo-Pacific strategy and geopolitical opportunities. The author explains that India has changed its strategic outlook because of China's growing influence in the region. The three key pillars of India's Indo-Pacific policy are strategic partnerships, enhanced relations with island states, and centralization of the Indian Ocean. However, the limitation of the essay is that it is mainly written from a military and strategic perspective and lacks an analysis of India's economic and cultural impact.

By exploring the processes of power projection, the research expands the understanding of security beyond traditional frameworks. This article works to connect the

perspectives of the United States and China, advancing the discussion of Indo-Pacific geopolitics through an innovative strategic approach.

Methodology

This study focuses on US and Chinese perspectives to analyze strategic ambiguity and power showcase in the Indo-Pacific area. Keeping in mind the main goal of the research, data has been collected and analyzed using both qualitative methods. The data has been collected mainly from secondary sources. Qualitative methods are used to interpret information and data from various sources, relevant to the research according to specific theoretical frameworks and contexts. Various means like research articles, Texts and books, Government reports, Private organizations, and print media have been used in collecting the data required for the research. This study follows a theoretical framework for data analysis, where the concepts of strategic ambiguity and power display are clarified.

Strategic Ambiguity

Strategic ambiguity creates uncertainty about intentions or commitments, which can prevent escalation in tense situations. For example, the United States has utilized this strategy regarding Taiwan by neither fully committing to defend it nor stating that it would not intervene in a conflict with China. This ambiguity serves to deter both sides from taking aggressive actions that could lead to conflict (Raymond Kuo, 2023).

By allowing multiple interpretations, strategic ambiguity can help diverse groups find common ground without forcing them into specific agreements that may not satisfy all parties involved. This is particularly useful in organizations where different teams may have varying interpretations of a strategy, enabling them to align on broader goals while retaining individual flexibility (Donaldson, S. 2022).

In international relations, strategic ambiguity serves as a tool for managing sensitive geopolitical situations. It helps maintain the status quo by preventing any one party from feeling secure enough to make unilateral moves that could disrupt peace (Raymond Kuo, 2023b).

Power Projection

Power projection is defined as the finite application of military power by national authorities to achieve specific political goals outside a country's borders. This includes operations that range from full-scale wars to smaller military engagements and

humanitarian missions (Karl P. Magyar, 2004). Power projection is crucial for maintaining national security and demonstrating military capabilities. It allows a nation to respond rapidly to crises, deter potential adversaries, and support allies. For instance, the U.S. Army's strategic power projection capabilities enable it to mobilize and deploy forces globally, ensuring readiness for various operational requirements (U.S. Army Materiel Command, 2020).

Indo-Pacific Area

The Indo-Pacific area generally refers to the vast region of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, extending from East Africa to the western Pacific Ocean. This region includes parts of South and Southeast Asia, East Asia, and Oceania. Specifically, this area includes countries such as India, China, Japan, Australia and Vietnam. The region is geopolitically, economically, and militarily important, as it is the main trade route of the world and a contested area for the influence of various powers.

The U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) defines its area of responsibility as extending from the waters off the west coast of the U.S. to the western border of India, covering a significant portion of both oceans (U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, 2023). This includes countries in East Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and parts of Oceania (U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, 2023).

China generally prefers the term Asia-Pacific over Indo-Pacific, arguing that the latter is a U.S.-led initiative designed to encircle and contain China. The Chinese government perceives the concept of the Indo-Pacific as an ideological tool used by the U.S. to diminish China's role and importance in regional affairs (Institute for Political and International Studies, 2021; Vaimiti Goin, 2024).

Power Players in Indo-Pacific

The Indo-Pacific region has become a region of great importance in contemporary world politics, as it is an important center of international trade and military power. There are some Power Players here-




Figure-1: Made by Researchers

Key Moments Shaping the Region

Indo-Pacific region has become one of the most important regions of global politics in the last few decades. Global power competition and political dynamics are increasing in the region due to its geographical location, economic importance, and strategic assets.

2007	• Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe introduce "wider Asia" concept linking India and the Pacific Ocean.
2013	• "Indo-Pacific" term grab the attention of US military.
2017	• "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" is emphasized by U.S. National Security Strategy.
2018	• US released Indo-Pacific Strategy Report.
2020	• Biden Administration strickly focus on free and open Indo-Pacific.
2021 (March)	• "Quad" Leaders Summit.
2021 (September)	• "AUKUS" announcement.
2022	• Biden Administration released "Indo-Pacific Strategy".
2023	• "QUAD" conducted joint military drill.

Figure-2: Key Moments by Year

United States in Indo-Pacific

Basically, we notice that the United States strengthened its presence in Indo-Pacific reason to stop the aggressive nature of China. China started pushing its neighbor country and demanding the land of others. The main concern for the United States is that China is literally challenging US-dominated world order. Three Key Documents of the United States:

Table-1: United States in Indo-Pacific

December 2017 •The first, the administration’s December 2017 National Security Strategy called China a ‘revisionist power’, and continued, ‘China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state-driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favor(US Government, 2017).	June 2019 •In June 2019, the Department of Defense published the second key document Indo-Pacific Strategy Report: Preparedness, Partnerships and Promoting a Networked Region(US Department of Defence, 2019).	November 2019 •In November 2019, the Department of State published the third foundational document, Free and Open Indo-Pacific: Advancing a Shared Vision(US Department of State, 2019).
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Power Projection of the United States

The U.S. has historically viewed the Indo-Pacific region as crucial for its national security and international standing. Since fiscal year 2020, Congress has appropriated over \$8.9 billion for military construction projects across Indo-Pacific sites, underscoring the importance of infrastructure improvements as a priority for U.S. defense strategy (Nicastro Luke A., 2023). The FY 2025 budget request for the PDI stands at \$9.9 billion, which includes targeted investments to enhance U.S. force posture and infrastructure resilience (US Department of Defence, 2024). The U.S. has negotiated access to 12 new defense sites in the Philippines and Australia since 2011, alongside constructing new installations in Japan and Guam. Existing facilities have also been expanded to accommodate increased operational demands (U.S. Naval Institute Staff, 2023). U.S. installations are strategically located not only in U.S. territories like Hawaii and Guam but also in allied nations such as South Korea and Japan. This extensive network is critical for rapid deployment and operational flexibility throughout the region (Nicastro Luke A., 2023). Guam is a very important US military base, located in the heart of the Indo-Pacific region. There is a strong presence of U.S. bombers, submarines, and military forces, enabling rapid military

response in the Pacific and surveillance of mainland China. Hawaii is home to the headquarters of the US Indo-Pacific Command, which determines overall military planning and strategy for the region.

Japan is also an important US military base, where US warships and warplanes are deployed, particularly in the Okinawa region. These bases help influence China's deterrence through rapid deployment in eastern China and the South China Sea. South Korea is a strategically important ally of the US and has an influential position close to China. Australia is a long-time ally of the United States and an important military base in the southern Indo-Pacific region. US joint military exercises and training programs with Australia consolidate their regional influence. The U.S. military maintains a robust presence with approximately 375,000 personnel in the Indo-Pacific, supported by a network of bases in Japan, South Korea, Australia, and other allied nations (Milhiet Paco, 2023a). The U.S. Air Force (USAF) operates around 2,500 aircraft from Pacific bases, ensuring air dominance over potential adversaries like China (Milhiet Paco, 2023b).

Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD)

The full name of QUAD is "Quadrilateral Security Dialogue," which is basically a strategic alliance between the United States, Japan, India, and Australia. The main objective of this alliance is to maintain stability in the Indo-Pacific region and to balance China's growing influence. The Quad idea was first floated in 2007, under the leadership of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe.

QUAD seeks to ensure stability in the Indo-Pacific by countering threats from state and non-state actors, particularly addressing concerns regarding China's assertiveness in the region (Kersten Alexander & Yoon Julia, 2014) (Fraser Dominique, 2023a). The group emphasizes adherence to international law, freedom of navigation, and overflight in maritime domains. This commitment is crucial for maintaining a rules-based order in the face of rising tensions (The White House, 2022b). QUAD aims to strengthen economic ties among member countries through initiatives focused on supply chain resilience, infrastructure development, and technology sharing (Fraser Dominique, 2023a). The dialogue also focuses on collective action against global issues such as climate change, health security (notably during the COVID-19 pandemic), and disaster relief efforts (The White House, 2022b). The establishment of the Quad Infrastructure Coordination Group aims to address infrastructure needs in the Indo-Pacific by

coordinating investments in sectors like digital connectivity and clean energy (Fraser Dominique, 2023b).

AUKUS

The formation of AUKUS was originally officially declared on 15 September 2021. It is a trilateral security agreement between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. AUKUS was formed to counter China for this reason mainly. There are some documented purposes as well. Australia acquired nuclear-powered attack submarines and the rotational basing of US and UK nuclear-powered attack submarines in Australia (Ronald O & Rourke, n.d.). The collaborative development of advanced capabilities in six technological areas: undersea capabilities, quantum technologies, artificial intelligence and autonomy, advanced cyber, hypersonic and counter-hypersonic capabilities, and electronic warfare; and two broader functional areas: innovation and information sharing (Nicastro, 2024; Prime Minister, 2022). Australia plans to acquire its first nuclear-powered submarines based on a UK design, with construction expected to begin by 2030; The U.S. will also sell Australia several Virginia-class submarines as an interim measure (Kahn Lauren, 2023; UK Parliament, 2024).

Strategic Ambiguity of the US in Indo-Pacific

US Strategic Ambiguity in the Indo-Pacific region is essentially a strategic view of US policy. Under this policy, the United States provides military and diplomatic assistance to Taiwan, but does not commit to engaging in direct military conflict with China. Over recent years, China's military capabilities have significantly advanced, leading to increased military maneuvers near Taiwan, including record numbers of aircraft incursions (Raymond Kuo, 2013). On the one hand, the United States has indicated that it will support Taiwan through the Taiwan Act and various military agreements, while on the other hand, it tries to maintain a neutral position without going into direct conflict with China. Supporters argue that this policy has successfully prevented conflict for decades and allows for flexibility in U.S. responses to various scenarios without committing to specific actions that could escalate tensions (Council on Foreign Relation, 2022). But this ambiguity by the United States also hinders China, because China is not sure how the United States will react to an attack on Taiwan.

Japan is particularly dependent on the U.S. security umbrella and seeks U.S. defensive assistance to counter a potential military threat from China. Though the US, provides

security and technical assistance to Japan, their commitment does not always warrant direct military intervention that's why sometimes it is not reliable. There is an ongoing debate about whether the U.S. should transition from strategic ambiguity to a more explicit commitment to defend its allies against aggression (Cunningham, 2024a). Strengthening trilateral cooperation among the United States, Japan, and South Korea is crucial for maintaining stability in Northeast Asia (Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, 2024). In South Korea's case, US strategic ambiguity provides security against North Korea's nuclear threat, but South Korea is also emphasizing increasing its military capabilities. Both countries are dependent on the US for aid and defense, but due to strategic ambiguity, they are focusing on rethinking their defense policies and building capabilities.

United States' strategic ambiguity has complicated its relations not only with its allies in the Indo-Pacific area but also with other countries. Historically, strategic ambiguity was seen as an effective deterrent against Chinese aggression. Critics argue that strategic ambiguity no longer serves its intended purpose and may even embolden China, as it has likely factored U.S. intervention into its military planning (Raymond Kuo, 2023a; Second Lieutenant Ethan D. Chaffee, 2023). Under this policy, the United States pledges to assist in the defense of several countries but is not committed to direct military intervention in crises. As a result, this ambiguity creates a strategic dilemma for other countries. Though the Philippines and Vietnam are US allies, they are not guaranteed any direct support or military action against China. The U.S. has positioned itself as a counterbalance to this influence through various alliances and partnerships, including QUAD and AUKUS (Poonkham, 2022; Salil, 2006).

Power Projection of China in Indo-Pacific

China's power projection in the Indo-Pacific area continues to grow and is considered an important strategy to expand regional influence using China's military, economic, diplomatic, and technological capabilities. As of 2023, China boasts the largest navy in the world, with approximately 355 vessels, and is rapidly increasing its military spending, which some estimates suggest could be as high as \$711 billion annually when accounting for various expenditures (Colin Clark, 2024; Second Lieutenant Ethan D. Chaffee, 2023). The development of hypersonic missiles and an expanding nuclear arsenal further underscores China's commitment to establishing a formidable deterrent against potential adversaries (Eaglen, 2024). China's military modernization, particularly under President Xi Jinping, has been systematic and ambitious to make the

People's Liberation Army (PLA) into a world-class military by 2049. The PLA's modernization is driven by several key objectives, including enhancing national security, asserting territorial claims, and projecting power regionally and globally (Bommakanti & Amjad, 2023; Maizland Lindsay, 2020). China has significantly modernized its military capabilities, which now include the largest standing army in the world, with approximately 2.8 million personnel across various branches such as the PLA Navy and Air Force (Brendan & Donnelly, 2023). Additionally, China's defense budget has seen consistent increases, reaching approximately \$223 billion in 2023, which supports these modernization efforts (Wuthnow, 2024).

Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is known as the One Belt One Road in other ways. The intention encompasses two primary goals: the Silk Road Economic Belt, which focuses on overland routes connecting China to Europe, and the Maritime Silk Road, which will link China to Southeast Asia, and South Asia (Chinatsu Tsuji, 2014; World Bank, 2018). The main objective of this project is to revive the ancient Silk Road, through which trade and infrastructure links between Asia, Europe, and Africa will be established. Under the BRI, China is investing heavily in infrastructure development in various countries, including railways, roads, ports, power projects, and other developmental projects. Chinese strategy of "String of Pearls" is a specific military and economic strategy aimed at establishing important waterways and infrastructure in the South China Sea and Indian Ocean areas. The term was first coined in a 2004 report by the U.S. consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton, which posited that China would seek to expand its naval presence by building civilian infrastructure that could also serve military purposes (LaunchPad IAS, 2023). Under this strategy, China is building ports, maritime infrastructure, and other supporting facilities in various countries, especially neighboring states. It includes Gwadar Port in Pakistan, Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka, and Djibouti, which hosts China's first overseas military base (CFR, 2023). China's "Blue Dragon" strategy is an integrated economic and military strategy aimed at modernizing China's navy and increasing its maritime capabilities around the world. The "nine-dash line," which claims approximately 90% of this contested sea area, has been a focal point of regional tensions involving countries like Vietnam and the Philippines (Eurasian Times, 2024; Maritime Executive, 2023). Furthermore, China's ambitions extend to transforming the Indian Ocean into what it refers to as the "Western Ocean," reflecting historical narratives while simultaneously seeking to dominate maritime trade routes (Khan Owais, 2023).

Strategic Ambiguity of China in Indo-Pacific

China's long-term goals in the Indo-Pacific are often not explicitly stated, leading to uncertainty among neighboring countries and global powers. The ambiguity surrounding China's military intentions complicates regional security dynamics, as neighboring countries are left to speculate about China's long-term goals (Jie, 2021; Li & Jiang, 2023). The BRI is perceived by some as a means for China to establish economic dependencies that could translate into political leverage (Womack Brantly, 2023). This lack of clarity allows China to maneuver flexibly, adapting its strategies based on regional reactions and international pressures (Jochheim & Lobo, 2023b). For instance, China's response to the U.S.-led Indo-Pacific strategy has been characterized by a mix of criticism and attempts to present itself as a cooperative partner in regional development (Seo, 2023; Teekah Ethan, 2024). Chinese strategic ambiguity in the Indo-Pacific area is part of the strategy to establish regional and global power. Through this ambiguity or ambivalence strategy, China is expanding its offensive influence. As China develops its military capabilities and asserts its territorial claims, it remains unclear what concessions it is willing to make or what strategies it will employ to achieve its goals in the face of U.S. opposition (Walters, 2023).

The rapid expansion of China's artificial islands is viewed with suspicion by neighboring countries. This has led to concerns that China may use these islands for military purposes rather than purely for economic development (Honrada Gabriel, 2024). As a result, countries like, Vietnam, Philippines, and Malaysia are skeptical of China's true intentions. In response to China's island-building activities, Vietnam is developing potential military structures on its outposts, which reflects a growing apprehension about China's assertiveness and the need to bolster its own defense (Strangio Sebastian, 2024). China's strategic ambiguity is also noticeable on the Taiwan issue. This vagueness allows China to maintain flexibility in its military strategy while keeping Taiwan and international observers uncertain about its true intentions (SAIS Review, 2024). China pursues its "one China policy" and claims Taiwan as part of China, but without direct military action, it continues to conduct military exercises and displays of military power. This uncertainty serves to deter Taiwan from pursuing any moves toward formal independence, as the consequences of such actions are unpredictable (Heritage Foundation, 2024). As a result, while the United States and its allies are under pressure to stand by Taiwan, their responses remain unclear as China does not attack directly.

Findings

A new Geopolitical situation emerged in the Indo-Pacific region because of strategic ambiguity and power projects on United States and China. Here United States came up with its allied countries and formed QUAD and AUKUS. Quad and AUKUS Nations want to control Chinese dominance in the Indo-Pacific region and they are exercising combined military drills. On the other hand, China came up with its own plan and strategy like 'String a pearls' and BRI. China is actually approaching the nation with wealth as there are many small developing countries in this region. Chinese economic health is needed for them this is how China is establishing its presence. The BRI project of China is a he-use project. By this project, China once connected Asia to Europe. China wants to overcome the Malacca dilemma by completing the BRI project.

Strategic Ambiguity is beneficial for the US and China both. The allied countries are confused on the grounds of direct military deployment of the US if there is any attack on them. As they are not sure they started boosting their military power. Taiwan and Japan are buying heavy military weapons from the United States. Not only Taiwan and Japan but also the other allied countries of the United States for this reason purchase weapons and military equipment from the United States.

Conclusion

We see here how important the Pacific region is and why its importance is increasing day by day. Along with this, as the importance of the Indo-Pacific region increases, we can learn from the research paper what methods the superpowers are adopting to maintain their dominance. Here, a review of various recharge paper books and publications related to this article shows that both the United States and China want their dominance in the region to continue. To maintain this dominance, they adopt a variety of policies and approaches that create dilemmas for smaller states about which side they should actually take. They are worried about which country will secure their national interest by making friends with it because it can be seen that China is a regional power here and it is a future superpower. On the other hand, the current United States is a superpower, and its dominance is all over the world, so it is difficult to decide which direction it will go. How the political and economic situation in the region will change in the future will depend on the strategic decisions of both countries and international cooperation. The geopolitical situation in the region is changing every day, and the strategic objectives and interests of both countries are in

conflict. In this case, both the United States and China should exercise restraint and stop pressuring small states so that they can independently build their own policies and fill this region with happiness and peace.

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