Impact of Boycott and Quorum Crisis in Parliamentary Governance on Bangladesh:

An Overview

Abstract

Bangladesh’s Jatiya Sangsad has experienced alternating cycles of legislative engagement and institutional stagnation since 1991, largely driven by two persistent disruptions: opposition boycotts and quorum crises. This study investigates the scale, patterns, and political incentives underlying these disruptions across the First to the Eleventh Parliaments, with concentrated analysis on the Seventh to Eleventh terms. Using a qualitative–quantitative mixed approach—drawing on Transparency International Bangladesh’s Parliament Watch data, constitutional and rules-of-procedure documents, parliamentary statistics, and peer-reviewed scholarship—the study maps historical-institutional dynamics and evaluates their implications for legislative productivity, executive oversight, fiscal accountability, and public trust. The findings show that boycotts and quorum crises are not episodic events but structurally embedded practices that weaken deliberation, expand executive discretion, and impose measurable financial and governance costs. The study contributes to existing literature by integrating longitudinal session-level data to reveal cumulative effects often overlooked in prior research and by proposing a conceptual model linking political incentives to legislative dysfunction. Limitations include reliance on secondary parliamentary datasets and the absence of primary interviews. Future research may incorporate comparative legislative studies and actor-level behavioral analysis to deepen understanding of institutional reforms required to strengthen parliamentary governance in Bangladesh.